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I. INTRODUCTION
The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long
tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the
individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experi-
ence that it is not within the power of the government to invade that citadel,
whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the
relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a po-
sition of neutrality. 1
Despite modern society's attempts at political correctness and in-
creasingly liberal social mores, certain issues continue to divide
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Philip Sparr, B.A. 2004, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; J.D. expected 2008,
University of Nebraska College of Law (Nebraska Law Review, Executive Editor,
2007). Thank you to my lady friend Christina for her patience, love, and support;
to my family for their encouragement and humor; and to BD for teaching me the
ways of the pastafarian.
1. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).
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friends, families, and nations. Religion is one such issue. The conflict
over religion's proper place in society is not limited to local coffee shop
banter, the purview of social commentators, or dinner conversation in
a gated suburban home. The Supreme Court has similarly struggled
to define a border in the morass between secular and sectarian. The
broad language of the First Amendment lends itself to diverse inter-
pretations and conflicting opinions, stating in part, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
free exercise thereof."2 This language has led to disagreement be-
tween Supreme Court Justices 3 and inconsistent employment of Es-
tablishment Clause "tests."4
The ongoing debate over the Establishment Clause's meaning re-
cently surfaced in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District.5 In Kitz-
miller, the Dover, Pennsylvania, school board passed a resolution
requiring a verbal disclaimer be read to high school biology students.
The disclaimer stated in part that there are unexplained gaps in the
theory of evolution and directed students to materials related to the
alternative theory of intelligent design ("ID").6 The Kitzmiller court
held the disclaimer violated the Establishment Clause and also deter-
mined that ID was a non-scientific, and hence theological, argument
for creation.7
The court in Kitzmiller relied on two Supreme Court tests to deter-
mine whether the Dover school board policy violated the Establish-
ment Clause. The first, articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman8 states,
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion."9 The second test, known as the
endorsement test and written by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Don-
nelly,'o provides that the key inquiry is the subjective intent of the
speaker and the objective meaning of the speech to a member of the
community. If the subjective intent of the speaker is to endorse or
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (utilizing the Lemon test in the
majority opinion, id. at 55-61, while the dissent argued Lemon was built upon a
fundamental misreading of the First Amendment, id. at 112-13 (Rehnquist, J.
dissenting)).
4. Id. at 63 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting the Court failed to utilize the Lemon
test in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) because there was a historical
acceptance of opening each Nebraska legislative session with a chaplain-led
prayer).
5. 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
6. Id. at 708-09.
7. Id. at 745-46.
8. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
9. Id. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted).
10. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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disapprove of religion or the objective effect of the speech endorses or
disapproves religion, a constitutional violation is present." Despite
the prevalence of these tests, the Supreme Court has yet to pronounce
a bright-line rule that is malleable enough to consistently adapt to
diverse factual situations. 12
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the contribution Kitzmiller
has made to Establishment Clause jurisprudence and to determine
what the decision means for the ongoing controversy regarding the
teaching of evolution and intelligent design in public schools. In order
to fully analyze the court's holding in Kitzmiller, one must first gain a
firm grasp of antecedent judicial opinions. Accordingly, section II.A
provides a summary of key Establishment Clause decisions from the
United States Supreme Court with an emphasis on cases involving
public schools. Given this contextual background, section III analyzes
the facts and holding of Kitzmiller.
In analyzing the Kitzmiller opinion, section IV of this Note ex-
plores two issues. First, in section IV.A, the author discusses whether
Kitzmiller serves as a guiding light of judicial clarity or as a continua-
tion of the splintered Supreme Court decisions that fail to clearly de-
fine the division between church and state. Upon considering the
Court's Establishment Clause precedent, the author argues that while
Kitzmiller fails to provide a unique test capable of drawing a bright
line, the opinion creates a useful roadmap under existing Establish-
ment Clause tests for courts analyzing proposals advocating or men-
tioning ID and/or criticizing evolution in public schools. Second, in
section IV.B, this Note explores whether the scientific legitimacy of ID
is now a foregone conclusion following Kitzmiller's scathing rebuke.
Furthermore, section IV.B analyzes whether the teaching of ID in
public schools can pass constitutional muster under a purpose or ef-
fects prong analysis following Kitzmiller. In particular, this section
will consider Kitzmiller's thorough dissection of the ID movement and
argues that the court's analysis has permanently tainted the ID move-
ment's scientific legitimacy and its hopes of constitutionally entering
the public school classroom under a purpose or effects prong analysis.
Section IV.B also recognizes that ID proponents have a slim chance of
giving light to their movement, but perhaps only at the cost of their
apparent goal of neutralizing evolution.
11. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
12. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (not-
ing the fractured plurality opinions in the wake of Lemon).
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II. BACKGROUND: ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church and State."
1 3
The Supreme Court's citation to Thomas Jefferson in Everson v.
Board of Education14 has become an oft-quoted metaphor in the sub-
sequent sixty years of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In Ever-
son, the Court considered a New Jersey school board resolution that
directly reimbursed parents for money spent transporting their chil-
dren to and from school on public buses.1 5 The money was given to
the parents of public school children and parochial school children.16
Justice Black, delivering the opinion of the Court, held the New Jersey
resolution did not breach the wall of separation between church and
state. Black stated the resolution did not provide money to parochial
schools, but merely helped parents, regardless of their religion, get
their children to school unharmed.17 The Court noted that if the
plaintiffs argument for separation was taken to its logical extreme,
the government would not be allowed to supply traffic officers to en-
sure safe crossing of streets or basic services such as water and
sewers. 18
The dissent, led by Justice Rutledge, rejected Justice Black's argu-
ment that traffic officers or basic services would be impermissible
under a strict enforcement of the Establishment Clause by noting
these are common rights, which are essential for safety.1 9 The dissent
championed the "wall of separation" metaphor too, but argued for a
stricter division of the realms of church and state and criticized the
majority's decision by stating even minor transgressions, such as
transportation reimbursement, corrode the "wall."20 The dissent ar-
gued the majority had breached the impregnable wall between church
and state and that the First Amendment's purpose was to completely
and permanently separate church and state.2 1 The dissent further
13. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
14. Id. at 16.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 18. Justice Black further stated that the "wall" between church and state
must be kept "high and impregnable." Id.
18. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
19. Id. at 60-61 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("The matter is not one of quantity, to be mea-
sured by the amount of money expended. Now as in Madison's day it is one of
principle, to keep separate the separate spheres as the First Amendment drew
them; to prevent the first experiment upon our liberties; and to keep the question
from becoming entangled in corrosive precedents.").
21. Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (stating the First Amendment comprehen-
sively forbids every form of aid or support for religion). For an alternative view of
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stated the majority failed to apply the very principles it avowed. 22
The fact that both the majority and dissent utilized the "wall of sepa-
ration" metaphor to arrive at divergent conclusions demonstrates that
even the Supreme Court had difficulty interpreting the Establishment
Clause and the metaphors premised upon it. Following Everson, sub-
sequent Supreme Court Justices nurtured the concept of a wall sepa-
rating church and state and warned against a progressive weakening
of the Establishment Clause.2 3 Despite pronouncing the "wall of sepa-
ration" metaphor, commentators have noted that the Court still
lacked an Establishment Clause test to give effect to the metaphor. 24
Though it did not explicitly employ an Establishment Clause test
to arrive at its holding, the Supreme Court again referenced Jeffer-
son's "wall of separation" in Epperson v. Arkansas.2 5 The Epperson
Court struck down a forty-year-old Arkansas state statute which pro-
hibited teaching evolution in public schools or universities. 2 6 The
statute was modeled after Tennessee's infamous "monkey law" which
was upheld in the landmark decision of Scopes v. Tennessee.2 7 In Ep-
person, a public school teacher was dismissed for teaching evolution to
her tenth grade biology students; she sought to enjoin her dismissal
and to have the Arkansas statute declared unconstitutional.28 The
Court, perhaps starting to define an Establishment Clause test, cited
a test which analyzes the purpose and primary effect of an enact-
ment 29 and held that the Arkansas statute was intended was to "blot
out" the teaching of evolution because it conflicted with the Biblical
view of divine creation. 30 The Court noted that the state could not
produce any justification, other than its citizens' religious beliefs, for
the statute.3 1 The Court held that while a state has the right to de-
cide curriculum for its schools, it cannot forbid the teaching of a doc-
the extent of the Establishment Clause's proscription, see Akhil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1157-62 (1991).
22. Everson, 330 U.S. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
23. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) ("The breach of neutrality that is
today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent . . . ."). Note
that by the time of Schempp, only Justices Black and Douglas remained from the
Court that decided Everson.
24. Marcia S. Alembik, The Future of the Lemon Test: A Sweeter Alternative for Es-
tablishment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1177 (2006).
25. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
26. Id. at 99 n.3 (reviewing a statute that stated in part "It shall be unlawful for any
teacher or other instructor in any University, College, Normal, Public School ...
to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower
order of animals .... ").
27. 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
28. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 100.
29. See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
30. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 108-09.
31. Id. at 107.
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trine if the reason for such prohibition contravenes the First
Amendment. 3 2
Three years after Epperson, the Court, expanding on its Epperson
decision, found guidance by constructing an influential Establishment
Clause test in Lemon v. Kurtzman.3 3 In Lemon, the Court invalidated
two statutes, one from Pennsylvania and the other from Rhode Is-
land.3 4 The Pennsylvania statute allowed the state to directly reim-
burse nonpublic schools for pedagogical materials, textbooks, and
teachers' salaries-provided that the subjects taught were secular in
nature. 35 Similarly, the Rhode Island statute allowed the state to di-
rectly supplement nonpublic school teachers' salaries so long as the
courses taught by the teachers were secular and the teachers agreed,
in writing, not to teach any course in religion while receiving the sal-
ary supplement.36
In invalidating both statutes, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, finally pronounced an Establishment Clause test: "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits relig-
ion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government en-
tanglement with religion."37 In applying the subsequently coined
"Lemon test," the Court determined that both statutes' purported pur-
poses passed constitutional muster since there was no indication ei-
ther legislature intended to advance religion.38 The Court further
determined that it did not need to pursue an effect prong analysis due
to the presence of an excessive entanglement of church and state.3 9
The Lemon Court found that the intense government oversight the
statute would require created a situation "pregnant with dangers" of
excessive entanglement of government and religion.40 Chief Justice
Burger and the majority opinion rejected the traditional "wall of sepa-
ration" metaphor pronounced in Everson and noted that "the line of
separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and varia-
ble barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relation-
32. Id. at 107-09.
33. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
34. Id. at 606-07.
35. Id. at 607-09.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted).
38. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
39. Id. at 613-15. The entanglement prong of Lemon has subsequently been sub-
sumed by the effect prong. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (noting
that the factors used to assess "entanglement" are the same as those used to as-
sess "effect").
40. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620-21 (noting that the States would be forced to maintain
surveillance over school records to quantify separate secular and sectarian
expenditures).
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ship."41 Burger's characterization of the metaphor was not
contradicted by any other member of the Court. Burger's opinion in
Lemon opinion coalesced past precedent into a constitutional test
whose influence has persisted but has also been increasingly subject
to criticism.42
Following Lemon, the Court's three-prong test was uniformly ap-
plied, despite one notable case which disregarded its directives en-
tirely.43 In Edwards v. Aguillard,44 a case cited repeatedly
throughout Kitzmiller, parents, teachers, and religious leaders chal-
lenged Louisiana's "balanced treatment" act which forbade the teach-
ing of evolution in public schools unless it was accompanied by a
course in "creation science."4 5 Neither evolution nor "creation science"
was a required course in Louisiana's public schools, but if one subject
was taught, it was required that it be "balanced" by its rival.46 The
Court in Edwards, employing Lemon, held that the act served no secu-
lar purpose and impermissibly advanced religion.47 The Court ar-
rived at this determination by analyzing the legislative history of the
act, which revealed earlier drafts explicitly defining "creation science"
in accordance with the Biblical account of creation.48 In its opinion,
the Kitzmiller court noted that the concept of ID came into existence
only after the decision in Edwards.49
In an attempt to clarify the Lemon test, Justice O'Connor proposed
a new paradigm in Lynch v. Donnelly.5 0 In Lynch, the Supreme Court
utilized the Lemon test and found that a creche displayed in a public
park alongside traditional Christmas decorations, such as Santa
Claus and his reindeer, did not violate the Establishment Clause.51
The Court found the creche was a passive acknowledgement of a holi-
day that has been officially recognized for twenty centuries. 5 2 The
Court held that this recognition of the holiday, and its historical ori-
41. Id. at 614.
42. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a humorous and scathing critique, Justice
Scalia compares the Lemon test to "some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed
and buried," lamenting Lemon's continued influence on the Court's Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 398.
43. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the Nebraska Legisla-
ture's practice of opening each legislative session with a chaplain-led prayer on
the grounds of its unique, historical tradition without applying the Lemon test).
44. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
45. Id. at 580-81.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 596-97.
48. Id. at 598-604 (Powell, J., concurring).
49. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 718 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
50. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
51. Id. at 694.
52. Id. at 686-87.
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gins, constituted a secular purpose for placing the creche in the dis-
play and that the creche did not impermissibly advance religion or
result in excessive entanglement of church and state.5 3 In a concur-
ring opinion, Justice O'Connor added to the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence when she penned what is now referred to as the
endorsement test.54
The endorsement test analyzes the subjective intent of government
practice (purpose) and the objective interpretation of that practice
when viewed from the perspective of a member of the community (ef-
fect). If either the subjective intention of the government's practice is
to endorse or disapprove of religion or the objective effect of the prac-
tice endorses or disapproves religion, a constitutional violation is pre-
sent.5 5 O'Connor felt she clarified Lemon's effect prong by stating that
the key inquiry is whether a government practice has the effect,
whether intentional or unintentional, of displaying a message of gov-
ernment endorsement or disapproval of religion.5 6 O'Connor consid-
ered the endorsement test's focus on entanglement and endorsement
or disapproval of religion as a clarification of Lemon as an analytical
tool, as opposed to an out-and-out replacement. 5 7
The endorsement test was narrowly adopted as a general approach
to Establishment Clause cases in a 5-4 Supreme Court decision in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter.58 The court
in Allegheny held that a freestanding creche on the staircase of a
county courthouse which displayed a sign reading, "Glory to God in
the Highest," violated the Establishment Clause. The Court noted
that unlike the display in Lynch, this creche was not surrounded by
other, traditional Christmas decorations which would detract from the
sign's inherently religious message and prevent the appearance of an
endorsement of a particular religious sect. 5 9 In Allegheny, Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Court, analyzed the case using O'Connor's
endorsement test and held that the courthouse display was unconsti-
tutional. 60 The Court's endorsement analysis focused on the effect of
the creche, leaving a purpose or entanglement prong analysis to the
53. Id. at 685.
54. Id. at 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political commu-
nity, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.").
55. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 690-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that government practice may in
fact result in advancement or inhibition of religion yet not offend the Establish-
ment Clause because the government practice does not thereby communicate a
message of endorsement or disapproval).
57. Id. at 688-89.
58. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
59. Id. at 581.
60. Id. at 621.
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lower court upon remand.6 1 In adopting the endorsement test, the
Court noted that the Establishment Clause forbids making belief in
religion relevant to a citizen's standing in the community. 6 2 Due the
location of the creche and its religious message exclaiming glory to
God, the Court in Alleghney held the display impermissibly endorsed a
particular religion. 63
Allegheny's main contribution is that it brought the concept of the
reasonable observer to the forefront; however, a majority of the Court
did not adopt the concept of a reasonable observer as the proper frame
with which to view the endorsement test's effect prong analysis. The
reasonable observer concept finds its origin in O'Connor's concurrence
in Lynch, but was given true definition in a later O'Connor opinion. 64
Echoing O'Connor's earlier concurrence, Blackmun felt the effect
prong of the endorsement test must be viewed from the perspective of
a reasonable observer familiar with the "history and ubiquity" of a
practice. 65 Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, criticized the reasona-
ble observer concept. 6 6 Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, proposed a far narrower Es-
tablishment Clause standard which would invalidate a government
practice only if an individual was coerced into supporting or practicing
religion.6 7 Justice Kennedy went so far as to claim the endorsement
test was "unworkable in practice."68
Although a majority of the Court in Allegheny did not adopt the
reasonable observer for an inquiry into the effect of a government
practice, it eventually gained acceptance. 69 The concept of a reasona-
ble observer has been consistently utilized in modern endorsement
61. Id. at 621.
62. Id. at 593-94 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
63. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 621.
64. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The rele-
vant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorse-
ment of prayer in public schools.").
65. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
66. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 642-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I shudder to think that
the only 'reasonable observer' is one who shares the particular views on perspec-
tive, spacing, and accent expressed in Justice Blackmun's opinion, thus making
analysis under the Establishment Clause look more like an exam in Art 101 than
an inquiry into constitutional law.").
67. Id. at 670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 669.
69. E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (utilizing the reasona-
ble observer to judge the objective effect of a student-delivered prayer before the
school's home football games).
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analyses, including the Kitzmiller opinion. 70 Notwithstanding greater
acceptance by the Court, the reasonable observer has been subject to
criticism. Many commentators have rejected the reasonable observer
concept, refuting the contention that a reasonable observer could ar-
rive at a singular conclusion and questioning the amount of knowl-
edge attributed to a reasonable observer. 7 1 In a response to the
difficulty of applying Lemon and the endorsement test in certain
cases, some Supreme Court Justices have proposed a different ap-
proach in recent years.
In Van Orden v. Perry,72 Justice Breyer contended the exercise of
sound legal judgment must trump a constitutional test.7 3 In Van
Orden, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Ten Command-
ments monument located on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol in
Austin based on its ancillary secular message and passive presence for
the preceding forty years.7 4 The Court determined that the context in
which the Ten Commandments were used conveyed a secular message
of proper social conduct and the relation of such conduct to the law.7 5
Justice Breyer reasoned that the purpose of the First Amendment was
to avoid division amongst the people. 76 Accordingly, he determined
that the existence of a secular purpose and the Texas monument's
non-divisive nature foreclosed any question of its constitutionality. 77
In a recent publication, the Harvard Law Review used the Kitzmiller
decision as a platform to champion Breyer's divisiveness analysis. 78
The article argued that divisiveness was the "Minotaur lurking in the
depths of the Establishment Clause"79 and that Breyer's test would be
superior to the established Supreme Court tests utilized in Kitz-
miller.80 The article proposes an interesting approach, but fails to ad-
dress the ad hoc pitfalls of a potential "Breyer test."
70. See infra section IV.A.
71. See generally Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objec-
tive Observer's Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 417 (2006) (Analyzing the impressive amount of knowledge the courts
have imported to the reasonable observer following Lynch, the author noted that
"today's reasonable observer is a veritable Jeopardy! Champion."). Id. at 454.
72. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
73. Id. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting a mechanical formula cannot determine
the constitutional borderline in all cases).
74. Id. at 681-83 (majority opinion).
75. Id. at 687-92.
76. Id. at 703-04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
77. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703-05 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
78. Recent Case, Middle District of Pennsylvania Holds That the Teaching of Intelli-
gent Design Violates the Establishment Clause, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2268 (2006).
79. Id. at 2275.
80. Id. at 2270 (noting that "'belts and suspenders' may be of little use when the
emperor has no clothes").
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In a separate opinion decided on the same day as Van Orden, the
Court utilized the reasonable observer standard, previously confined
to an effect prong analysis, to determine the purpose of a government
practice.8 1 In McCreary County v. ACLU, the Court upheld a district
court injunction that required the removal of Ten Commandments dis-
plays from two Kentucky county courthouses.8 2 The Court found the
posting of the Ten Commandments unconstitutional and stepped into
new territory by employing the perspective of a reasonable observer
for an analysis of government purpose.8 3 In utilizing the reasonable
person for a purpose analysis, the Court noted that "[tihe eyes that
look to purpose" should be objective.8 4 The Court affirmed the injunc-
tion by noting that a reasonable observer, despite post-litigation alter-
ation of the displays, would suspect the counties' purpose was to keep
religious documents in plain view at all costs.8 5 The ultimate ramifi-
cations of the Court's opinion have yet to materialize, but the importa-
tion of the reasonable observer to a purpose prong analysis has piqued
academic interest.8 6 This interest is due to the fact the Court had
previously limited the reasonable observer concept to an analysis of
the effect of a government practice.8 7
The key difference between the monument upheld in Van Orden
and the monument struck down in McCreary appears to boil down to
the prominence of the respective monuments and the persistence of
time. In Van Orden, the monument on the grounds of the Texas Capi-
tol was flanked by seventeen other monuments on the capitol grounds
and had existed without challenge for forty years.8 8 Conversely, in
McCreary, the monuments were freestanding, highly visible exhibits
which were immediately challenged by the ACLU.89 The Court's deci-
sion in both cases seems to echo the distinction made between the
creche in Lynch, surrounded by other Christmas decorations, and the
creche in Allegheny, which was freestanding. 90 If the Dover School
Board in Kitzmiller had required disclaimers for several different cur-
riculum courses, their actions may have passed muster like the monu-
ment in Van Orden. However, the Dover resolution's solitary and
conspicuous criticism of evolution helped seal its fate. Despite bur-
81. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
82. Id. at 880-81.
83. Id. at 861-66.
84. Id. at 862.
85. Id. at 873-74.
86. See, e.g., Christopher B. Harwood, Evaluating the Supreme Court's Establish-
ment Clause Jurisprudence In the Wake of Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary
County v. ACLU, 71 Mo. L. REV. 317 (2006).
87. Id. at 366.
88. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681-82 (2005).
89. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 844.
90. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 581
(1989).
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geoning Supreme Court analyses, the Lemon test, the endorsement
test, and the viewpoint of the reasonable observer remain entrenched
in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence canon.
III. KJTZMILLER V. DOVER AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT
In November of 2004, the Dover Area School District in Penn-
sylvania announced that beginning in January 2005, science teachers
at Dover High School would be required to read the following state-
ment to their ninth grade biology students:
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about
Darwin's Theory of Evolution and eventually to take a standardized test of
which evolution is a part.
Because Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new evi-
dence is discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist for
which there is no evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation
that unifies a broad range of observations.
Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs from
Darwin's view. The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is available for stu-
dents who might be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelli-
gent Design actually involves.
With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to keep an open mind.
The school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to individual students
and their families. As a Standards-driven district, class instruction focuses
upon preparing students to achieve proficiency on Standards-based
assessments. 9 1
On December 14, 2004, eleven plaintiffs filed suit in federal district
court for the middle district of Pennsylvania against the Dover Area
School District and its board of directors.9 2 The plaintiffs alleged that
the school district's policy, which required reading the aforementioned
statement, violated the First Amendment. 93 Students were allowed to
"opt out" of a reading of the disclaimer if their parents signed a release
form.9 4 The Kitzmiller court criticized the "opt out" policy because it
forced students to either submit to a reading of the policy or leave the
classroom entirely.95 The disclaimer thereby placed students in the
precarious position which the Establishment Clause protects against,
namely making non-adherents to government practice outsiders. 96
The plaintiffs, all parents of Dover School District students, sought to
enjoin the school district from maintaining its disclaimer policy. 97
Employing a "belt and suspenders" approach, the court analyzed the
91. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708-709 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
92. Id. at 709.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 727-28 & n.8.
95. Id.
96. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 727-728 & n.8 (M.D. Pa.
2005).
97. Id. at 709-10.
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school district's ID policy separately under both the Lemon test and
the endorsement test.98 Utilizing a reasonable observer's perspective,
the court held that the Dover Area School District's policy was imper-
missible under the Establishment Clause and enjoined the district
from maintaining its policy.9 9
In arriving at this conclusion, the court exhaustively chronicled the
historical foundations of the ID movement (e.g., creationism and crea-
tion science) and adjudged ID a non-scientific, religious argument.1 0 0
The court noted that ID allows for supernatural explanations of natu-
ral phenomena, which is in complete contrast to the scientific method
requiring testability.1 0 1 Though many organizations seek to criticize
or marginalize evolutionary theory,1o 2 the Discovery Institute ("the
Institute") has assumed a prominent role nationally. The Institute,
and one of its Center for Science and Culturelo 3 senior fellows, Profes-
sor Michael Behe,l04 played key roles in Kitzmiller. The Institute,
based in Seattle, is a think tank which promotes and funds ID re-
search and criticism of evolutionary theory. The Institute is one of
ID's biggest proponents, and seeks to legitimize ID as an alternative
scientific theory.
The Institute filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Dover Area
School District, supporting the district's disclaimer and highlighting
ID's secular goal of promoting critical consideration of science. 1 0 5 It is
apparent from the Kitzmiller opinion that members of the Dover
School Board had contact with an Institute lawyer during the develop-
ment of their ID policy. A Dover board member even arranged for Do-
ver High School's science teachers to watch an Institute video entitled
"Icons of Evolution."10 6 Furthermore, one of the Institute's most
prominent fellows, Professor Behe, served as lead defense expert, rep-
resenting the scientific aspirations of the ID movement. The impor-
tance of Behe's presence in the Kitzmiller court cannot be
underestimated. By analyzing the arguments of one of the most prom-
inent and respected ID supporters in the country, the Kitzmiller
98. Id. at 714 n.4.
99. Id. at 765-66.
100. Id. at 765. ("[Wie have addressed the seminal question of whether ID is science.
We have concluded that it is not, and moreover that ID cannot uncouple itself
from its creationist, and thus religious, antecedents.")
101. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
102. See, e.g., Intelligent Design Network: Seeing Objectivity in Origins Science,
http://www.intelligentdesignnetwork.org/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
103. Center for Science and Culture, Discovery Institute, httpJ/www.discovery.org/
csc/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
104. Biography of Dr. Michael Behe, Lehigh Department of Biological Sciences, http:l!
www.lehigh.edu/-inbios/faculty/behe.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
105. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist, No. 4:04-CV-2688, 2005 WL 3628833 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 17, 2005).
106. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
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court's opinion went to the heart of the ID movement and created an
analytical roadmap for other courts to follow.
In rejecting Behe's purported scientific arguments for ID, the Kitz-
miller court focused on three primary grounds. First, ID allows for
supernatural explanation of natural phenomena, which is contrary to
the scientific method which requires testability. 10 7 Second, ID's de-
sign argument for irreducible complexity,' 0 8 like its predecessors,
seeks to strengthen its own cause by criticizing evolution.1 0 9 Third,
ID's negative arguments, such as irreducible complexity, are refuted
by the scientific community. 1 10 The initial ground cited by the court
questions ID's permissive use of supernatural explanations, e.g., crea-
tion by an intelligent designer, for natural phenomena.'1 1 The court
noted that every scientific group or association that maintained a posi-
tion on ID had, without reservation, declared ID non-scientific be-
cause its theory was not testable or subject to being disproved. 112
Furthermore, the court held that acceptance of ID would force the
very definition and nature of science to be broadened to include non-
testable, supernatural theories. 11 3 This scientific sea change was one
of the purported goals of the Institute.114
The second and third grounds the court discussed in questioning
ID's scientific credentials involved a thorough analysis of the ID con-
cept of irreducible complexity. The court initially noted that irreduci-
ble complexity is not an argument for ID as much as it is an argument
against evolution.115 Irreducible complexity is akin to the concept of a
car engine, in that all individual pieces, e.g., sparks plugs, pistons,
etc., are required for the entire system to function. Behe conceded
that there were no peer-reviewed publications that showed complex
molecular systems were intelligently designed. 1 6 Therefore, it must
be inferred that ID's irreducible complexity is an argument of mere
107. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735-36 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
108. Id. at 739. Defense witness Michael Behe defined "irreducibly complex" as "a
single system which is composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that
contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal of any one of the parts
causes the system to effectively cease functioning." Id.
109. Id. at 738.
110. Id. at 735.
111. Id. at 736 ("'Darwinists object to the view of intelligent design because it does not
give a natural cause explanation of how the various forms of life started in the
first place,'" quoting the ID textbook Pandas.).
112. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 737 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
113. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 736-37 (2005).
114. Id. (referencing the Institute's "Wedge Document," which outlines ID's strategy
for replacing science in its current form with a theistic form of science (i.e., ID)).
See also The "Wedge Document": "So What?," http://www.discovery.org/scripts/
viewDB/filesDB-download.php?id=349 (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (containing the
full text of the "document" and the Institute's response to the controversy).
115. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 738-39 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
116. Id. at 745.
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assertion, which lacks evidentiary support and which is not subject to
the scientific scrutiny applied to evolutionary theories. The district
judge rejected Behe's contentions, holding ID's arguments against
evolution required proof of evolution to such a degree that it created
too high of a burden of proof."17 Following this extensive refutation of
ID's arguments against evolution, the court analyzed Of Pandas and
People ("Pandas"), the ID text Dover students were directed to by the
district's disclaimer.118
Thanks to unrebutted testimony of the plaintiffs' expert, the court
determined Pandas contained misrepresentations, exclusion of key
scientific theories, and obsolete concepts.119 The court also looked to
earlier editions of Pandas and made a startling discovery. The court
discovered that prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Edwards,120
Pandas' definition of creation science was identical to the current defi-
nition of ID.121 Furthermore, the Kitzmiller court noted that shortly
after the Court's condemnation of creation science in Edwards, the
Pandas text systematically removed all references to creation science
and replaced them with references to ID.122
In holding ID is not science, the Kitzmiller court noted that ID is
not supported by peer-reviewed journals or publications, and the ID
movement does not engage in research and testing.123 Behe failed to
convince the court ID was anything more than an "interesting theolog-
ical argument."12 4 Under its application of the endorsement test, the
court held that an objective reasonable observer, whether a Dover stu-
dent or adult, would view the school's disclaimer as an official en-
dorsement of religion.125 The court buttressed its holding by noting
that official disclaimers highlighting fallacies and/or gaps in theory
were not proposed in any other scientific courses. 12 6 Furthermore,
there was no showing that disclaimers had previously been used in
any other course in the school's entire curriculum. 12 7 Though the
opinion was written after the Supreme Court's decision in McCreary,
the Kitzmiller court did not import a reasonable person analysis to the
purpose prong despite the Court taking that step in McCreary.128
117. Id. at 741.
118. Id. at 743-44.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
121. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 721 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 745.
124. Id. at 745-46.
125. Id. at 734.
126. Id. at 724-25 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 727.
128. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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Under an application of the Lemon test, the court determined the
purpose and principal effect of the school board's policy was to ad-
vance religion.129 Citing Supreme Court precedent for its inquiry, the
court's purpose prong inquiry took special note of the sequence of
events leading to adoption of the policy and determined the ostensible
purpose of improving scientific education was a sham.13 0 The court
noted that the board's president, Alan Bosnell, stated creationism and
school prayer were his highest priorities during a Dover School Board
retreat.13 1 A school board member further testified that Mr. Bosnell
stated that he did not believe in evolution and wanted creationism to
be taught alongside evolution.132 Additionally, it was revealed that
copies of the ID textbook Of Pandas and People were purchased with
money donated at the Sunday service of a board member's church af-
ter he described the intended use of the funds. 13 3 Following its pur-
pose prong inquiry, the court held that under the endorsement test
and the purpose prong of Lemon, the district's disclaimer was
unconstitutional. 134
The court then briefly analyzed the disclaimer under the effect
prong of Lemon. The Kitzmiller court held that, following its determi-
nation that ID was not science, the effect of the disclaimer impermissi-
bly advanced religion by questioning evolution's scientific credentials
and subsequently directing students to an alternative religious con-
cept. 13 5 Given the court's endorsement analysis, the non-scientific na-
ture of ID itself, and a purpose and effects prong analysis, the court
entered a declaratory judgment enjoining the Dover Area School Dis-
trict from enforcing the ID disclaimer. 136
IV. ANALYSIS
There is no end in sight for the ongoing struggle to define a univer-
sal rule in Establishment Clause cases. The endorsement and Lemon
tests continue to be used extensively by courts across the nation, but
have been deemed mere guideposts by some. 13 7 The Supreme Court
has given the endorsement test primacy in recent decisions, leading
some, despite Justice O'Connor's own view of her endorsement test,138
129. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 747 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
130. Id. at 762-63.
131. Id. at 748.
132. Id. at 748-49.
133. Id. at 756.
134. Id. at 763.
135. Id. at 763-64.
136. Id. at 766.
137. E.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
138. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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to proclaim that the Lemon test has been abandoned.139 It is not the
aim of this Note to propose a new analytical weapon for the Supreme
Court's quiver, though many such proposals exist.140 Rather, the aim
of this Note is to determine the contribution of the court's opinion in
Kitzmiller to Establishment Clause jurisprudence and its effect on the
ID movement.
A. Kitzmiller's Contribution to Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence
In short, the Kitzmiller decision fails to provide a fresh approach to
the Establishment Clause quagmire. The court's analysis is thorough
and supported by Supreme Court precedent, but it serves as a mere
continuation of established tests, as opposed to a guiding light for the
future. However, given the doctrine of stare decisis, Kitzmiller's ad-
herence to Supreme Court precedent is a requirement, not a failure of
creativity.' 41 By focusing on the question of ID's scientific legiti-
macy, 142 the Kitzmiller court created a persuasive roadmap for subse-
quent adjudication. By adhering to established Supreme Court tests,
Kitzmiller's framework allows other courts to competently analyze is-
sues addressing .ID and/or criticizing evolution in the nation's class-
rooms. Despite its adherence to precedent, Kitzmiller took an
interesting approach by utilizing the endorsement test and the Lemon
test, separately and distinctly, in a "belt and suspenders" approach to
analysis of the Dover disclaimer. 14 3 The court explained its decision
to use both tests noting the evolving nature of Establishment Clause
case law and the fact that its Third Circuit brethren had applied both
tests in its past decisions. 1 44 One of the Third Circuit cases followed
by Kitzmiller determined it was best to analyze an Establishment
Clause case under both Lemon and the endorsement test because a
reviewing court might prefer one test to the other.145
139. See Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L.
& POL. 499 (2002) (discussing the Court's criticism of Lemon, the inconsistent
judgments Lemon has wrought, and the Lemon test's over-inclusive purpose
prong).
140. See generally Louis J. Virelli III, Making Lemonade: A New Approach to Evaluat-
ing Evolution Disclaimers Under the Establishment Clause, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV.
423 (2006) (proposing an intriguing importation of the disparate-impact test used
in analyzing discriminatory statutes under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
to cure the Court's Establishment Clause ails).
141. "Stare decisis" is defined as "the doctrine of precedent, under which it is neces-
sary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise
again in litigation." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004).
142. See infra section IV.B.
143. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
144. Id. at 713-14 & n.4.
145. Freethought Soc'y of Greater Philadelphia v. Chester County, 334 F.3d. 247, 261
(3rd Cir. 2003) (noting that a higher court may prefer to analyze an Establish-
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Following the Supreme Court's lead, the Kitzmiller court's endorse-
ment analysis focused on whether the ID policy marginalized students
and whether it had the effect of evincing a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion.146 The court noted that the district's "opt out"
policy marginalized students who did not wish to be exposed to the
disclaimer.14 7 Mirroring O'Connor's concurring language in Lynch,
the court held that forcing students to either submit to hearing the
disclaimer or be excused from the classroom during the reading of the
disclaimer would have presented a message to non-participating stu-
dents that they were "not full members of the political community
.... "148 The Kitzmiller court's endorsement test analysis adopted the
post-Lynch, majority opinions of the Supreme Court by analyzing the
Dover Area School District's practice from the perspective of a reason-
able, objective observer. Specifically, the court looked to the perspec-
tive of an objective Dover adult, student, and citizen.14 9 Given the
forum in which the disclaimer was delivered, a public high school, the
perspective of a reasonable observer seems particularly apt. An objec-
tive Dover adult, student, or citizen is the proper lens with which to
view the district's disclaimer because it places the court in the position
of those whom the disclaimer directly affected. The thorough and co-
gent inquiry into the perspective of a reasonable observer in Kitz-
miller stands in stark contrast to one Supreme Court Justice's
contention that the concept of a reasonable observer was closer to an
art exam than a judicious inquiry into constitutional law.150
In Kitzmiller, the court imbued each reasonable observer with an
impressive awareness of historical and cultural backgrounds includ-
ing intricate knowledge of Supreme Court opinions and the develop-
ment of the ID movement. 15 1 It may be difficult to fathom that an
objective observer, regardless of their location, would be personally fa-
miliar with the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
over the past forty years. The amount of information and keen aware-
ness of historical and cultural contexts imported to the court's reason-
able observer in Kitzmiller may seem unrealistic at first blush and is,
perhaps, why there is such vehement criticism of the reasonable ob-
server concept. However, the court's actions do not constitute a mas-
ment Clause question under Lemon despite the recent preference for the endorse-
ment test).
146. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 715 ("[Tlhe endorsement test is designed to ascer-
tain the objective meaning of the statement that the District's conduct communi-
cated in the community by focusing on how 'the members of the listening
audience' perceived the conduct ... .
147. Id. at 727-28.
148. Id. at 728 (internal citations omitted).
149. Id. at 715-16.
150. See supra note 66.
151. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 716-23 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
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querade whereby the court injects its own knowledge into the vessel of
a reasonable resident of Dover. The amount of knowledge attributed
to a reasonable observer in Kitzmiller is supported by the widespread
discussion of ID in print and other media and considerable Supreme
Court precedent. Since O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch, the reasona-
ble observer's depth of knowledge has continued to grow, despite
criticism. 15 2
At the outset, the court determined that the relevant inquiry into
the disclaimer's potential endorsement of religion should be analyzed
from the perspective of a Dover student. 153 In its analysis of an objec-
tive Dover student, the court in Kitzmiller stated, "a reasonable, objec-
tive student is not a specific, actual student, or even an amalgam of
actual students, but is instead a hypothetical student, on to whom the
reviewing court imputes detailed historical and background knowl-
edge . ."154 The amount of information presumed available to the
Kitzmiller court's observer ranges from the historical context of ID,
including its origins in creationism and creation science, to an aware-
ness of the Dover disclaimer's message. In dissecting the language of
the Dover disclaimer itself, the court determined the disclaimer sent a
message to students that evolution is a problematic theory that the
state requires the school to teach.155 Furthermore, the disclaimer de-
notes gaps in evolutionary theory, without mentioning gaps in any
other scientific field or any of the arguments refuting ID.156 The
court's discussion of the perspective of an objective Dover student
stands to reason. Considering that the school had no history of read-
ing disclaimers in any other curricular courses, it is more than likely a
student hearing the disclaimer would hold evolution to a level of scru-
tiny not applied to other school courses.
The court took the additional step of viewing the endorsing effect of
the disclaimer from the perspective of an objective Dover adult and
citizen.157 The court's reasonable adult was presumed to know that
ID is the progeny of creationism and that the prominent ID textbook,
Of Pandas and People, is published by a Christian organization. 158
The court further determined a reasonable observer would be aware
152. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 800 n.5
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Referring to O'Connor's reasonable observer, Jus-
tice Stevens stated: "I think this enhanced tort-law standard is singularly out of
place in the Establishment Clause context. It strips of constitutional protection
every reasonable person whose knowledge happens to fall below some "'ideal'"
standard.").
153. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
154. Id. at 723.
155. Id. at 724 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 724-25.
157. Id. at 727-28.
158. Id. at 721.
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that ID's proposal of a "master intellect" as the designer of the uni-
verse is a thinly veiled euphemism for God.15 9 Aside from a sidestep
into the realm of science fiction, a plain consideration of the term
"master intellect"160 would invariably lead to the conclusion that the
sentient being referenced in Pandas is God. The Kitzmiller court's
presumption regarding the euphemistic "intellect" is thoroughly real-
istic considering the amount of press the ID movement has received in
recent years. Even an objective student would, more than likely, be
familiar with ID and its ostensible goal of professing alternative ap-
proaches to evolution. Ultimately, the court determined that any of
the objective observers would find the district's disclaimer policy an
endorsement of religion because of the social context in which the pol-
icy arose. 16 1
In keeping with the recent trend of other Third Circuit cases, 16 2
the Kitzmiller court buttressed its endorsement analysis of the Dover
disclaimer with a Lemon analysis. The court noted that the Supreme
Court has looked to the context of the government's words and the
sequence of events leading to passage of a resolution in order to deter-
mine legislative purpose. 163 Accordingly, the Kitzmiller court chroni-
cled the events that led to passage of the ID policy. Alan Bosnell, the
president of the Dover school board, confided in a fellow board mem-
ber that he did not believe in evolution and fervently desired that cre-
ationism be taught alongside evolution. 164 The court recounted
various statements by board members during a 2004 board meeting
that included statements to the effect that the separation of church
and state is a myth and that creationism should be taught at Dover
High School.165
It was also revealed that Buckingham had overseen the removal
and burning of an evolution mural from the Dover school. 16 6 Perhaps
most damaging was the revelation that Buckingham had solicited do-
nations from his church and used the money to purchase copies of Of
Pandas and People for use at Dover High School.1 6 7 Given these
events, the court held that Dover's purported purpose of improving
159. Id. at 718-19 (quoting an excerpt of Pandas, which leaves the identity of the
ultimate "intelligent agent" to religion and philosophy).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 734.
162. See supra notes 144-45.
163. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 746-747 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
595 (1987)).
164. Id. at 748-49.
165. Id. at 751-52.
166. Id. at 753 (noting Buckingham "gleefully watched it burn" and subsequently de-
manded Dover's teachers agree never to place an evolution mural in a classroom
again).
167. Id. at 756.
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science education was a sham.168 All of the actions and statements of
the board show that the disclaimer policy, and ID itself, was directly
related to personal, religious beliefs. In adhering to the same kind of
legislative purpose inquiry employed in Epperson,16 9 Kitzmiller reju-
venates the importance of the Lemon test and serves as a model for
courts analyzing legislative statements made during the development
of acts which advocate for or mention ID and/or criticize evolution in
public schools. Kitzmiller shows that it is not so much the test that
results in ambiguity as it is how the test is applied. Those awaiting a
clarion Supreme Court opinion which will pronounce an unambigu-
ous, uniform Establishment Clause test will likely be waiting for some
time. In the interim, opinions such as Kitzmiller show that existing
tools, despite some criticism, can serve us well if properly used.
Though it did not do so, the court's analysis could have potentially
utilized the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer in which he argued
that the First Amendment seeks to prevent division amongst the peo-
ple. 170 The court quoted a Dover resident to show the divisive effect of
the school board's policy: "Well, it's driven a wedge where there hasn't
been a wedge before. People are afraid to talk to people for fear, and
that's happened to me. They're afraid to talk to me because I'm on the
wrong side of the fence."171 Additionally, one Kitzmiller plaintiffs mo-
tives were questioned by her own daughter.172 In stark contrast to its
purported goal of enhancing the critical thinking of its students, the
declaration, as read by Dover administrators following the protest of
Dover High's science teachers, stated there would be no further dis-
cussion of ID, and Dover teachers would not answer questions regard-
ing ID.173 It is ironic that that the Dover school board would nullify
any teacher-student discussion of the concept of ID when one of the
supposed goals of the disclaimer was to encourage an open mind. In a
similar manner to their endorsement analysis, the court held that,
due to ID's non-scientific nature, the curriculum change pursued by
168. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 762-63 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(noting the school board contacted no scientific authorities and disregarded the
district's own science teachers and relied on the advice of religious institutions in
creating the disclaimer).
169. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
170. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703-04 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
171. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 762.
172. See Margaret Talbot, Darwin In the Docket: Intelligent Design Has Its Day in
Court, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 2005, at 66 (quoting plaintiff Julie Smith's
daughter following a discussion with friends at Dover High School, "Mom, evolu-
tion is a lie. What kind of a Christian are you?").
173. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 727 (noting that by refusing to discuss ID further,
the school district sends the message that ID is some sort of secret science that no
one can discuss).
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the Dover school board had the purpose and effect of unconstitution-
ally advancing religion.174
Though the Kitzmiller opinion fails to propose a fresh approach to
existing Establishment Clause tests, its impact on a purpose or effects
prong analysis of ID and/or criticism of evolution in public schools is
where the Kitzmiller case makes a lasting mark. It would be taxing,
to say the least, to construct a post-Kitzmiller set of facts in which a
school board could survive either a purpose or effect prong analysis of
a policy that endorsed or implied the use of ID or criticized evolution.
That is not to say proponents of ID, or its potential successor, will
discontinue their efforts to gain a place in the consciousness of
America's youth. However, Kitzmiller's purpose and effects prong
analysis caused irreparable damage to ID's ability to enter America's
classrooms. Utilizing existing Supreme Court tests, the court in Kitz-
miller effectively pinned ID and its criticism of evolution to religion
and created a thorough and cogent roadmap subsequent courts will
have difficulty resisting.
B. Kitzmiller's Impact on the Intelligent Design Movement
[T]he Court is confident that no other tribunal in the United States is in a
better position than are we to traipse into this controversial area. Finally, we
will offer our conclusion on whether ID is science not just because it is essen-
tial to our holding that an Establishment Clause violation has occurred in this
case, but also in the hope that it may prevent the obvious waste of judicial and
other resources which would be occasioned by a subsequent trial involving the
precise question which is before US. 1 7 5
Although Kitzmiller fails to propose a unique and unifying Estab-
lishment Clause test, District Judge John E. Jones III dealt a crip-
pling blow to ID's hopes of pedagogical legitimacy. Jones' thorough
opinion directly addressed and ultimately refuted ID's scientific cre-
dentials. The Kitzmiller opinion meticulously traced ID's lineage from
earlier rivals of evolution (e.g., creationism and creation science) and
exposed its theistic underpinnings. 176 Accordingly, Kitzmiller se-
verely, if not completely, hindered the prospect of constitutionality
teaching ID and criticism of evolution in public schools under a pur-
pose or effects prong analysis. Just as creationism and creation sci-
ence were used to sterilize the effect of evolution in previous
generations, ID has become the modern weapon of choice in an ongo-
ing confrontation between secular and sectarian views. President
George W. Bush lent strength, even if tacitly, to ID's cause in the fol-
lowing exchange with reporters during a roundtable interview in the
Roosevelt Room of the White House in 2005.
174. Id. at 764.
175. Id. at 735.
176. Id. at 716-19.
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Q: I wanted to ask you about the-what seems to be a growing debate over
evolution versus intelligent design. What are your personal views on that, and
do you think both should be taught in public schools?
The President: "I said that, first of all, that decision should be made to local
school districts, but I felt like both sides ought to be properly taught."
Q: Both sides should be properly taught?
The President: "Yes, people-so people can understand what the debate is
about."
Q: So the answer accepts the validity of intelligent design as an alternative to
evolution?
The President: "I think that part of education is to expose people to different
schools of thought, and I'm not suggesting-you're asking me whether or not
people ought to be exposed to different ideas, and the answer is yes." 1 7 7
The words of the President serve as further evidence of the perva-
sive nature of this divisive issue. In addition to Bush's comments, the
ID movement has been pushed to the forefront of a national debate in
recent years due to school board actions in Dover, Pennsylvania,178
Lebec, California,179 and Cobb County, Georgia.1so This truncated
list is far from complete, but it serves to highlight the prominence of
the ID-evolution debate.
Following the re-definition of Kansas state science standards in
2005,181 the Discovery Institutel8 2 heaped praise on Kansas' new
standards that altered the definition of science to allow for supernatu-
ral explanations of natural phenomena.1S3 This victory for the ID
movement led to nationwide criticism of the Kansas board, including a
tongue-in-cheek retort which pronounced its own unique version of in-
177. Transcript of Roundtable Interview, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 2, 2005, http:/!
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080200899-
5.html
178. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 707.
179. A course entitled the "Philosophy of Design" was temporarily taught in the El
Tejon School District. Eleven parents filed suit, and the school district settled out
of court, agreeing to discontinue the course. See Stipulation for dismissal with
prejudice, Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.au.org/site/DocServer/Stipulation_for_Dis-
missal-Order.pdf?doclD=561.
180. See Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005),
vacated by, 449 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (Refusing to make a ruling on any
legal issues, the Eleventh Circuit Court remanded the case for further factfind-
ings due to evidentiary uncertainties.).
181. Kansas Science Education Standards, http://www.ksde.orgoutcomes/sciencestd.
pdf (last visited July 22, 2006).
182. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
183. MSNBC News Services, Kansas Education Board Downplays Evolution: State
School Board OKs Standards Casting Doubts on Darwin, MSNMC, Nov. 8, 2005,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9967813/ (An Institute spokesperson stated, "Students
will learn more about evolution, not less as some Darwinists have falsely
claimed.").
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telligent design.' 8 4 Meanwhile, others have gone so far as to proclaim
Kansas' standards unconstitutional.18 5 Following the adoption of
Kansas' new science standards, a University of Kansas professor, Paul
Mirecki, created a course entitled "Special Topics in Religion: Intelli-
gent Design, Creationism, and other Religious Mythologies."'8 6 A
storm of controversy followed, the KU course was dropped and, to add
insult to injury, Mirecki was assaulted. 8 7 ID proponents have simi-
larly mocked, though perhaps less deftly, evolution's theory on the ori-
gins of life.188
Following an extensive and cogent analysis, the court held that
while ID may be an interesting supernatural theory, it is not sci-
ence. i8 9 Not long after the Kitzmiller decision was handed down,
Behe penned a point-by-point response to the court's opinion.190 In
his response, Behe defined science as "an unrestricted search for the
truth about nature based on reasoning from physical evidence." 19 1
Under this broad definition, Behe stated ID is science. 19 2 Behe ar-
gued that the Kitzmiller court confused ID with creationism in the
184. See Bobby Henderson, Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, http://www.ven-
ganza.org/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (introducing the satirical "Flying Spaghetti
Monster," whose "noodly appendage" is claimed to have created the universe and
further noting that the Flying Spaghetti Monster is angered if followers do not
wear "His" chosen outfit, full pirate regalia).
185. See Anthony Kirwin, Toto, I've a Feeling We're... Still in Kansas? The Constitu-
tionality of Intelligent Design and the 2005 Kansas Science Education Standards,
7 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 657 (2006).
186. Scott Rothschild, KU Course Creates Furor in Topeka, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-
WORLD, Nov. 29, 2005, http://www2.1jworld.com/news/2005/nov/29/kucoursecre-
ates furor topekafevolution.
187. Ron Knox, Eric Weslander, Mirecki Hospitalized After Beating, LAWRENCE JOUR-
NAL-WORLD , Dec. 5, 2005, http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2005/dec/05/mirecki-
hospitalized afterbeating?breaking.
188. See ANN COULTER, GODLESS: THE CHURCH OF LIBERALisM 214 (Doug Pepper &
Jed Donahue eds., Crown Forum 2006) (postulating that the theory of evolution
is as farcical as the possibility that a giant raccoon, who passed gas long ago,
could account for all the diversity of life we see today). In her "Acknowledge-
ments" Coulter thanks Michael Behe and William Dembski for their tutelage re-
garding evolution. Id. at 303. Both Behe and Dembski are fellows for the
Discovery Institute's Center for Science and Culture, and Behe served as a key
witness for the Dover School District in Kitzmiller.
189. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 745-46 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(Rejecting the defendant's argument that the disclaimer was intended to promote
critical thinking, the court responded by stating, "The goal of the IDM is not to
encourage critical thought, but to foment a revolution which would supplant evo-
lutionary theory with ID.").
190. See Dr. Michael J. Behe, Whether Intelligent Design is Science: A Response to the
Opinion of the Court in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, http://www.dis-
covery.org/scripts/viewDB/filesDB-download.php?command=download&id=697
(last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
191. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
192. Id.
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course of its analysis and further claimed that the Big Bang The-
ory,19 3 like ID's supernatural designer, cannot be explained via natu-
ral causes. 194 Behe concluded by noting that biological realities,
despite Kitzmiller, are not subject to adjudication and that there are
still no non-design explanations for the complex machinery of life.195
Commentators have disagreed over the wisdom of the Kitzmiller
court's adjudication of ID's scientific worthiness.196
Notwithstanding Behe's refutation and other critical commentary,
Kitzmiller dealt a severe blow to the ID movement and its hopes of
expanding its sphere of influence into America's public schools. By
directly tracing ID's lineage to creationism and creation science, Kitz-
miller attenuated ID's hopes of nurturing a theory that would rival
and supplant evolution in the classroom. While Kitzmiller is not a Su-
preme Court-or even United States Court of Appeals-decision, the
court's opinion will serve as persuasive authority in future debates re-
garding the constitutionality of teaching ID or directing students to ID
and its criticism of evolution. The Kitzmiller opinion has likely fore-
closed any question of ID's scientific credentials and its hopes of at-
taining a foothold in public school classrooms. Under a purpose or
effects prong analysis, any court would struggle mightily to separate
ID from its historical baggage and its endorsement of supernatural
creation. The Kitzmiller court itself noted that "since ID is not sci-
ence, the conclusion is inescapable that the only real effect of the ID
Policy is the advancement of religion."19 7 Given the in-depth exami-
nation of ID and, through this examination, the conclusion that ID is
inextricably linked to creationism and creation science, it would seem
that ID, or its next incarnation, would face a formidable task in enter-
ing public school science classes under an effects prong analysis. If
courts are willing to imbue the reasonable observer with knowledge of
Supreme Court precedent and ID's historical development, surely the
193. Defined under "cosmology," "[A]t the beginning of time, all of the matter and en-
ergy in the universe was concentrated in a very dense state, from which it 'ex-
ploded,' with the resulting expansion continuing until the present." THE
COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 663 (5th ed. 1993).
194. See supra note 190 at p. 3 (refuting the Kitzmiller court's contention that all sci-
ence is explained by natural phenomena).
195. Id. at p. 11.
196. Compare Jay D. Wexler, Kitzmiller and the "Is it Science?" Question, 5 FIRST
AMENDMENT L. REV. 90 (2006) (contending that while Kitzmiller got it "95% cor-
rect", the court's analysis of whether ID is science was superfluous to whether the
school's disclaimer advanced religion), with Richard B. Katskee, Why It Mattered
to Dover that Intelligent Design Isn't Science, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 112
(2006) (providing commentary by a principal attorney for plaintiffs in Kitzmiller,
which claims that the court in Kitzmiller had to address the ID's scientific basis,
or lack thereof, in order to determine the purpose and effect of the school's
disclaimer).
197. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 764 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
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high profile nature of the Kitzmiller decision will place the reasonable
observer on further notice of what is truly being said when ID or its
texts are mentioned.
Although Kitzmiller may have dashed any hopes of ID supplanting
or rivaling evolution in the nation's public schools, it will certainly not
stop the ID movement itself. The logical question to be asked is, what
is the next step for ID proponents? Just as creationism and creation
science transformed into ID, the current incarnation of ID will, like a
chameleon, adapt to the landscape and seek other means to its goals.
The Supreme Court has noted, "[I]t might well be said that one's edu-
cation is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the
history of religion."198 In Abington, the Court also notes that
"[niothing we have said here indicates that ... study of the Bible or of
religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of
education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amend-
ment."'199 Accordingly, ID may be able to survive judicial proscription
if offered as an elective course.
However, this would require ID proponents to accept defeat, at
least temporarily, in the area of science and focus on elective courses
discussing philosophy or the history of religion as an end-run around
judicial inquiry into the purpose or effect of such a course discussing
ID. One school district's elective course addition was unsuccessful.200
Following the Court's opinion in Abington, a school board would have
to walk a fine line between the devotional practice of religion and the
educational study of religion. While the former approach would not
pass muster under Lemon or the endorsement test, the latter would
have a chance. However, given ID's dependence on an "intelligent de-
signer" or "master intellect," any elective course would likely have to
discuss several different theories as part of a survey course in relig-
ious history or philosophy in order to avoid offending the First Amend-
ment. Nevertheless, ID proponents seeking to neutralize the effect of
Darwinism and evolution may not consider this slim foothold a posi-
tive step in the first place.
Even if ID proponents do not choose this path, future courts may
limit Kitzmiller's holding to its own facts. Additionally, a less conspic-
uous school board policy may neglect to mention ID by name and take
its chances. Any of these possibilities could potentially prevent an
application of Kitzmiller. However, given the near ubiquitous pres-
ence of ID and the Kitzmiller decision, subsequent courts would be
remiss to refuse the roadmap Kitzmiller created. The constitutional
approaches available to ID were discussed by one commentator
198. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
199. Id.
200. See supra note 179.
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shortly before Kitzmiller was decided. 20 1 The commentator suggested
ID may be able to successfully pursue alternative approaches includ-
ing elective courses and after school clubs. 20 2 However, the commen-
tator concluded that ID faces an uphill battle given the overwhelming
evidence supporting evolution.20 3
The Kitzmiller court stated its goal in exploring whether ID was
science was to prevent the future waste of judicial efforts regarding
ID's scientific credentials;204 this goal may have been attained. While
no prominent ID cases have yet to surface in the wake of Kitzmiller,
the effect of the court's opinion has already been felt outside the court-
room. The Kansas science standards, 20 5 trumpeted by ID proponents
as a major victory, may soon return to the traditional definition of sci-
ence. The voters of Kansas recently ousted two conservative members
of the Kansas Board of Education who favored science standards chal-
lenging evolution. 2 06 A New York Times article noted that several of
the newly elected board members promised to revisit the controversial
standards in order to prevent criticism of evolution.207 The article
also stated the Kansas election results were the third major defeat of
the ID movement in recent years, counting the Kitzmiller decision and
Ohio's post-Kitzmiller decision to drop a portion of their state science
standards that allowed for critical analysis of evolution20s as the other
major defeats. 209
V. CONCLUSION
The question of the origins of life is eternal and certainly will not
be conclusively determined or decided by the opinion of a court. Views
regarding the origins of life and their place in our schools have led to a
division of opinion. The ID controversy highlighted in Kitzmiller
serves as a reminder of this division. The Kitzmiller opinion will not
change the beliefs of ID proponents; in fact, the opinion may serve to
stoke their fires further. However, the legal importance of the Kitz-
201. See Stephanie L. Shemin, The Potential Constitutionality of Intelligent Design?,
13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 621 (2005).
202. Id. at 684-88 (noting students who are objectively exposed to a non-critical ver-
sion of ID, evolutionary theory, and other discussions of the origins of life will be
able to weigh the merits of each and decide for themselves which course they
choose).
203. Id. at 695.
204. See supra note 175.
205. See supra note 181.
206. Monica Davey & Ralph Blumenthal, Fight Over Evolution Shifts in Kansas
School Board Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2006, at A15.
207. Id.
208. Jodi Rudoren, Ohio Board Undoes Stand on Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006,
at A14.
209. Davey & Blumenthal, supra note 206.
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miller decision cannot be minimized. As discussed above, the court's
thorough analysis led to the determination that ID is not science. 2 10
In arriving at this conclusion, the court placed ID's hopes of entering
America's schools on the precipice of defeat. By exhaustively tracing
ID's heritage to creationism and creation science, the court effectively
foreclosed the questions of ID's scientific legitimacy under a purpose
or effects prong analysis. The Kitzmiller court did so by relying on the
established canon of Establishment Clause tests provided by the Su-
preme Court.
The question to be asked is whether evolution and religious convic-
tions can coexist. In its conclusion, the Kitzmiller court answers in the
affirmative. 21 1 However, the court is silent as to how the two can rea-
sonably coexist. The court notes that one of the main concerns of ID
proponents is the effect of "scientific materialism" (i.e., evolution). 2 12
ID proponents feel that "scientific materialism" looks strictly to scien-
tific explanations and denies the moral and religious aspects of the
pursuit of knowledge. The fear of a science detached from morality
should not be dismissed easily. One commentator, discussing this
very concern, noted that scientists should focus on the appropriate
uses of scientific knowledge and not just discovery in and of itself.2 13
How religious convictions and science should interact is a very per-
sonal question which Kitzmiller cannot be expected to resolve. What
Kitzmiller means to the conflict of religion and science is that ID, or its
potential successor, will have to overcome the albatross of religious
association before it can successfully enter the nation's science class-
rooms. In a pre-emptive strike against critics of his opinion in Kitz-
miller, Judge Jones III offered the following:
Those who disagree with our holding will likely mark it as the product of an
activist judge. If so, they will have erred as this is manifestly not an activist
Court. Rather, this case came to us as the result of the activism of an ill-
informed faction on a school board, aided by a national public interest law
firm eager to find a constitutional test case on ID, who in combination drove
the Board to adopt an imprudent and ultimately unconstitutional policy.
2 1 4
The Kitzmiller opinion may have stuck a severe blow to ID and
proponents of a theistic version of science, but the pendulum is sure to
210. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 745-46 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
211. Id. at 765 ("Plaintiffs' scientific experts testified that the theory of evolution rep-
resents good science, is overwhelmingly accepted by the scientific community,
and that it in no way, conflicts with, nor does it deny, the existence of a divine
creator.").
212. Id. at 737 n.14 (referring to the effects of such materialism as "devastating," and
promoting a science in line with Christian convictions).
213. See Anne Marie Lafoso, Does Changing the Definition of Science Solve the Estab-
lishment Clause Problem for Teaching Intelligent Design as Science in Public
Schools? Doing an End-Run Around the Constitution, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 219, 277
(2006) (emphasis added).
214. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
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swing back. Regardless of the result of this ongoing debate, the Kitz-
miller opinion offers guidance in a conflict which all too often prizes
passion over reason. Future courts may choose to follow a different
path, but they will have difficulty resisting the thorough and rational
reasoning Kitzmiller displays.
